Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 Jul y 1947: "The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon."
The Association of Arab-American University Graduates finds it compelling to inaugurate its new
publication series, Special Documents, with Oded Yinon's article which appeared in Kivunim
(Directions) , the journal of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization. Oded
Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly attached to the Foreign Ministry of Israel. To our
knowledge, this document is the most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of the
Zionist strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation of the "vision"
for the entire Middle East of the presently ruling Zionist regime of Begin, Sharon and Eitan. Its
importance, hence, lies not in its historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.
The plan operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1) become an imperial regional
power, and 2) must effect the division of the whole area into small states by the dissolution of all
existing Arab states. Sma ll here will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state.
Consequently, the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel's satellites and, ironically, its
source of moral legitimation .
This is not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic thinking. Indeed,
fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a recurrent theme. This theme has been
documented on a very modest scale in the AAUG publication,Israel's Sacred Terrorism(1980), by
Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime Minister of Israel, Rokach's study
documen ts, in convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in th e
mid-fifties.
The first massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to the minutest detail. The
second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect
certain parts of this plan which hopes to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, in
fragments. This ought to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong and
independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a Lebanese central government
that sanctions their regional imperialist designs by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek
acquiescence in their designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as by
the Palestinian people. What they want and what they are planning for is not an Arab world, but a world
of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, "A
Strategy for Israel in the 1980 's," talks about "far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967"
that are created by the "very stormy situation [that] surrounds Israel."
The Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very much an active policy, but is
pursued more forcefully in times of conflict, such as in the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An
appendix entitled "Israel Talks of a New Exodus" is included in this publication to demonstrate past
Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from their homeland and to show, besides the main Zionist document
we present, other Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.
It is clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982, that the "far-reaching
opportunities" of which Zionist strategists have been thinking are the same "opportunities" of which
they are trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their June, 1982 invasion.
It is also clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target of Zionist plans, but the priority target
since their viable and independent presence as a people negates the essence of the Zionist state. Every
Arab state, however, especially those with cohesive and clear nationalist directions, is a real target
sooner or later.
Contrasted with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy elucidated in this document, Arab and
Palestinian strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and incoherence. There is no indication that
Arab strategists have internalized the Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead, they react with
incredulity and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab reaction, albeit
muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as long as the Zionist strategy for th e Middle
East is not taken seriously Arab reaction to any future siege of o ther Arab capitals will be the same.
Foreward
The following essay represents, in my opinion, the accurate and detailed plan of the present Zionist
regime (of Sharon and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division of the whole area into
small states, and the dissolution of all the existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect of
this plan in a concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several important
points:
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again and
again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz
(and probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the "best" that can happen
for Israeli interests in Iraq: "The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni state and the separation
of the Kurdish part" ( Ha'aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old.
2. The strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent, especially in
the author's notes. But, while lip service is paid to the idea of the "defense of the West" from Soviet
power, the real aim of the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: To make an Imperial
Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of Sharon is to deceive the Americans after he has
deceived all the rest.
3. It is obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in the text, is garbled or omitted,
such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel . Much of it is pure fantasy. But , the plan is not to be
regarded as not influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The plan follows faithfully
the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of 1890-1933 , which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the
Nazi movement, and determined their aims for East Europe . Those aims, especially the division of the
existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the global scale prevented their
consolidation for a period of time.
The notes by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I did not add any notes of my own, but
have put the substance of them into this foreward and the conclusion at the end. I have, however,
emphasized some portions of the text.
A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties
by Oded Yinon
This essay originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions) , A Journal for Judaism and
Zionism; Issue No, 14--Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor: Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli
Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of
Publicity/The World Zionist Organization , Jerusalem.
At the outset of the nineteen eighties the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective as to its place, its
aims and national targets, at home and abroad. This need has become even more vital due to a number
of central processes which the country, the region and the world are undergoing. We are living today in
the early stages of a new epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its
characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known. That is why we need an
understanding of the central processes which typify this historical epoch on the one hand, and on the
other hand we need a world outlook and an operational strategy in accordance with the new conditions.
The existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon its ability to adopt a
new framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.
This epoch is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and which symbolize a
genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant process is the breakdown of the rationalist,
humanist outlook as the major cornerstone supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization
since the Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated from this
foundation have been based on several "truths" which are presently disappearing--for example, the view
that man as an individual is the center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic
material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has become clear that the
amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man's requirements, his economic needs or his
demographic constraints. In a world in which there are four billion human beings and economic and
energy resources which do not grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to
expect to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society, i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless 1
consumption. The view that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather his
material needs do--that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a world in which nearly all values
are disappearing. We are losing the ability to assess the simplest things, especially when they concern
the simple question of what is Good and what is Evil.
The vision of man's limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the sad facts of life, when we
witness the break-up of world order around us. The view which promises liberty and freedom to
mankind seems absurd in light of the sad fact that three fourths of the human race lives under
totalitarian regimes. The views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by
socialism and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to the truth of
these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into practice properly and the majority of
mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear
world in which we are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the concept of peace and
coexistence among nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds a military and
political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a nuclear war possible and necessary in order to
achieve the ends of Marxism, but that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one
can be victorious in it. 2
The essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are undergoing a change due to
political, military and economic transformations. Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR
has transformed the epoch that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will
demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in comparison with which the past
world wars will have been mere child's play. The power of nu clear as well as of conventional weapons,
their quantity, their precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years,
and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the main threat to our existence
and that of the Western world. The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and the 3
need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World, are transforming the world
we know, given that one of the major aims of the USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over
the g igantic resources in the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of
world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global confrontation which will face
us in the future.
The Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas of the Third World.
That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine which holds that it is possible to manage, win and
survive a nuclear war, in the course of which the West's military might well be destroyed and its
inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger to world peace and to
our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is the
continuation of policy in nuclear means," and made it the motto which guides all their policies. Already
today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and throughout the world, and the need to face
them becomes the major element in our country's security policy and of course that of the rest of the
Free World. That is our major foreign challenge. 4
The Arab Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall face in the
Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against Israel, due to its growing military might.
This world, with its ethnic minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly self-
destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in Syria, is unable to deal
successfully with its fundamental problems and does not therefore constitute a real threat against the
State of Israel in the long run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great
import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present framework in the areas
around us without having to go through genuine revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is
built like a temporary house of cards put together by foreign ers (France and Britain in the Nineteen
Twenties), without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into account. It was
arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of minorites and ethnic groups which are
hostile to one anoth er, so that every Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic so cial destruction from
within, and in some a civil war is already raging. Most of th e Arabs, 118 million out of 170 millio n, 5
live in Africa, mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
Apart from Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and non-Arab Berbers. In
Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains between the two nations in the
country. Morocco and Algeria are at war with each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal
struggle in each of them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes wars
which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is sparsely populated and
which cannot become a powerful nation. That is why he has been attempting unifications in the past
with states that are more genuine, like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab
Moslem world today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni minority
which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni
Moslem majority facing a large minority of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7
million of them, so that even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a
state of their own, something like a "second" Christian Lebanon in Egypt.
All the Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner conflict even more
than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different from Lebanon except in the strong
military regime which rules it. But the real civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority
and the Shi'ite Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to th e severity of the
domestic trouble.
Iraq is, once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although its majority is Shi'ite and the
ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-fiv e percent of the population has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20
percent holds the power. In addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren't for
the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq's future state would be no different
than that of Lebanon in th e past or of Syria today. The seed s of inner conflict and civil war are apparent
today already, especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader wh om the Shi'ites in Iraq
view as th eir natural leader.
All the Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a d elicate house of sand in which there is
only o il. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis co nstitute only a quarter of the population. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites are
the majority but are deprived of power. In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis
are in power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marx ist South Yemen there is a
sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a
Saudi minority holds power.
Jordan is in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but most of the army and
certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestin ian. As a matter of fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nab lus. All
of these countries have powerful armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The
Syrian army today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, th e Iraqi army Shi'ite with Sunni
commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is wh y it will not be possible to retain
the loyalty of the army for a long time except where it comes to the only common denominator: The
hostility towards Israel, and today even th at is insufficient.
Alongside the Arabs, split as they are, the other Mo slem states share a similar predicament. Half of
Iran's population is comprised of a Persian speaking group and the other half of an ethnically Turkish
group. Turkey's population comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two large
minorities, 12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afgh anistan there are 5 million
Shi'ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan there are 15 million Shi'ites who
endanger the existence of that state.
This national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from Somalia to Turkey
points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration in the entire region. When this picture is
added to the economic one, we see how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to
withstand its severe problems.
In this giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass of poor people. Most
of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 30 0 dollars. That is the situation in Egypt, in mo st of the
Maghreb countries except for Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to
pieces. It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto sovereign authorities
(Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an
area of direct Syrian conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south and
up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO and Major Haddad's state of
Christians and half a million Shi'ites). Syria is in an even graver situation and even the assistance she
will obtain in the future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with the basic
problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is in the worst situation: Millions are
on the verge of hunger, half the labor force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely
populated area of the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating efficiently
and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends entirely on American foreign assistance
granted since the peace. 6
In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest accumulation of money and oil in
the world, bu t those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a wide base of support and self-confidence,
something that no army can guarantee. The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime 7
from real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an example. A sad
and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-
reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967 . Chances are that opportunities missed at that time
will become achievab le in the Eighties to an extent and along dimensions which we cannot even
imagine today.
The "peace" policy and the return of territories, through a dependence upon the US, precludes the
realization of the new option created for us. Since 1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our
national aims down to narrow political needs, on the one hand, and on th e other to destructive opinions
at home which neutralized our capacities both at ho me and abroad. Failing to take steps towards the
Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the course of a war forced upon us, is the major
strategic error committed by Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved
ourselves all the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jord an to the Palestinians who
live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have neutralized the Palestinian problem which
we nowadays face, and to which we have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as
territorial compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing. Today, we suddenly face 8
immense opportunities for transforming the situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming
decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state.
In the course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through far-reaching changes
in its political and economic regime domestically, along with radical changes in its foreign policy, in
order to stand up to the global and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil
fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in the Sinai peninsula which
is geomorphologically identical to the rich oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy
drain in the near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present GNP as well
as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil. The search for raw materials in the Negev and 9
on the coast will not, in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
(Regaining) the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is therefore a political priority
which is obstructed by the Camp David and the peace agreements . The fault for that lies of course with
the present Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of territorial
compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians will not need to keep the peace
treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they will d o all th ey can to return to the fold of the Arab world
and to th e USSR in order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only for a
short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S. both at home and abroad will bring
about a reduction in aid. Without oil and the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we
will not be able to g et through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to act in order to
return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai prior to Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace
agreement signed with him in March 1979 . 1 0
Israel has two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the other indirect. The
direct option is the less realistic one because of the nature of the regime and government in Israel as
well as the wisdom of Sadat who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of
1973, his major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the treaty, neither
today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically and politically and Egypt provides Israel
with the excuse to take the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short h istory. What is left
therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the nature of the regime and its pan-
Arab po licy, will bring about a situation after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or
indirectly in order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve for the long
run . Egypt does n ot constitute a military strategic problem due to its internal conflicts and it could be
driven back to the post 19 67 war situation in no more than one day. 11
The myth of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and definitely
did no t survive 1967, but our po licy, as in the return of the Sinai, served to turn the myth into "fact." In
reality, however, Egypt's power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has
gone down about 50 p ercent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political power in the Arab
World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without foreign assistance the crisis will come
tomorrow. In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain several advantages at our 12
expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and that will not change the balance of power to its
benefit, and will possibly bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political p icture, is
already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking
Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen
Eighties on its Western front .
Egypt is divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart, countries like Libya,
Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue to exist in their p resent form and will join the
downfall and dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt alongside a
number of weak states with very localized power and without a centralized government a s to date, is the
key to a historical development which was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems
inevitable in the long run . 13
The Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less complicated than the
Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the headlines have been taking place recently.
Lebanon's total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world
including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that track. The
dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is
Israel's primary target on the Eastern fron t in the long run, while the d issolution o f the military power
of th ose sta tes serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in acco rdance with its
ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a
Shi'ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus
hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state , maybe even in our Golan, and
certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan . This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and
security in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach today . 14
Iraq, rich in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate for
Israel's targets . Its dissolution is even more important for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than
Syria. In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian
war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able to organize a struggle on a
wide front against us. Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will
shorten the way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in
Lebanon . In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Otto man times
is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and
Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north. It is possible that
the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen this polarization. 15
The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external
pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether its economic
might based on oil remains intact or whether it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and
breakdowns are a clear and natu ral development in light of th e present political structure. 1 6
Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but no t in the long run, for it does not
constitute a real threat in the long run after its disso lution , the termination of the lengthy rule of King
Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.
There is no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long time, and Israel's
policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present
regime and the transfer of power to th e Palestin ian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will
also cause the termina tion of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west of the
Jordan. Whether in war or under cond itions of peace, emigrationfrom the territories and economic
demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the coming change on both banks of the river, and
we ought to be active in order to accelerate this process in the nearest future . The autonomy plan ought
also to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for, given the plans of the
PLO and th ose of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the Shefa'amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible
to go on living in this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the Arabs to
Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river . Genuine coexistence and peace will reign over the
land only when the Arabs understand that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will
have neither existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only in Jordan. 17
Within Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories beyond them, those of '48, has
always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no longer has any significance for us. The problem
should be seen in its entirety without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear, under any future
political situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution o f the problem of the indigenous Arabs will
come only when they recognize the existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and
beyond it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch which we shall soon enter. It
is no longer possible to live with three fourths of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is
so dangerous in a nuclear epoch.
Dispersal of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order; otherwise, we
shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the Galilee are our sole guarantee for
national existence, and if we do not become the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the
country and we shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow, and in
which they were foreigners to begin with. Reb alancing the country demographically, strategically and
economically is the highest and most central aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from
Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is the national aim g enerated by th e major strategic co nsideration which
is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of Jews today . l8
Realizing our aims on th e Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal strategic
objective. The transformation of the p olitical and economic structure, so as to enable the realization of
these strategic aims, is the key to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized
economy in which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as well as to
switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our own hands, of a genuine
productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able to make this change freely and voluntarily, we
shall be forced into it by world developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, an d politics,
and by our own growing isolation. l 9
From a military and strategic po int of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to withstand the global
pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel must therefore stand alone in the Eighties,
without any foreign assistance, military o r economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no
compromises. Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the condition of world 20
Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but the only existential option. We cannot
assume that U.S. Jews, and the communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the
present form in the future . 21
Our existence in this country itself is certain , and there is no force that could remove us from here either
forcefully or by treachery (Sadat's method). Despite the difficulties of the mistaken "peace" policy and
the problem of the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with these problems
in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Three imp ortant points have to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities
of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to be published.
The Military Background of The Plan
The military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many occasions where
something very like it is being "explained" in closed meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment,
this point is clarified. It is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are insufficient
for th e actual work of occupation of such wide territories as discussed above. In fact, even in times of
intense Palestinian "unrest" on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are stretched out too much.
The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of "Haddad forces" or of "Village Associations"
(also kn own as "Village Leagues"): local forces under "leaders" completely dissociated from the
population, not having even any feudal or party structure (such as the Phalangists have, for example).
The "states" proposed by Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and their armed forces
will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli military superiority in such a situation will be much
greater than it is even now, so that any movement of revolt will be "punished" either by mass
humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and obliteration of cities, as in
Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to ensure this, the plan , as explained orally, calls for the
establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states, equipped with the necessary
mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen something like this in Haddadland and we will almost
certainly soon see the first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all
Lebanon.
It is obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend also on the Arabs
continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on the lack of any truly progressive mass
movement among them. It may be that those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be
well advanced, with consequences which can not be foreseen.
Why it is necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great measure of
freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with expansionism and racist discrimination. In
such a situation the Israeli-Jewish elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin's speeches) has to be
persuaded . The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as indicated above, but a time comes in
which it becomes inconvenient. Written material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid
"persuaders" and "explainers" (for example medium-rank officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid).
They then "learn it," more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even the
Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well remember how (before I
was "in opposition") the necessity of war with was explained to me and others a year before the 1956
war, and the necessity of conq uering "the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the opportunity"
was explained in the years 1965-67.
Why is it assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of such plans?
Such risks can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel is very weak (a
situation which may change as a consequence of the war on Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the
Palestin ians, and the United States. The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed
and rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on the average, no better
than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism
(which are real enough) are doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of
belief in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent writing on the wall of
the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the Euphrates. Another example is the persistent,
and completely false declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that
the two b lue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize th e Nile and the Euphrates, while in fact they are taken
from the stripes o f the Jewish praying shawl (Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole,
the Arabs will pay no attention to th eir serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war has
proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods of persuading other Israelis?
In the United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or less serious
commentators take their information about Israel, and much of their opinions about it, from two
sources. The first is from articles in the "liberal" American press, written almost totally by Jewish
admirers of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state, practice loyally what
Stalin used to call "th e constructive criticism." (In fact those among them who claim also to be "Anti-
Stalinist" are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with Israel being their god which has not yet failed).
In the framework of such critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always "good intentions"
and only "makes mistakes," and therefore such a plan would not be a matter for discussion--exactly as
the Biblical genocides committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The
Jerusalem Post , has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation exists in which Israel is really a
"closed society" to the rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes , the publication and
even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman
of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers , collections of key
articles from the Hebrew press, and is the author of numerous articles and books, among them Non-Jew
in the Jewish State . His latest book is Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression , published by the
AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
1 . American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979. According to this research, the population of the world
will be 6 billion in the year 2000. Today's world population can be broken down as follows: China, 958 million;
India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million
each. According to the figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50 cities with a
population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third World will then be 80% of the world population.
According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S. Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion because of
hunger.
2 . Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and
Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War , (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the Soviet
Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear
war and there is a great deal of documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air Force,including
USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet View , Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of
the Soviet State . Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is presented in the
book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow: Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet
Doctrine and Concepts (New York, Praeger, 1963).
3 . A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn from the book by Douglas and Hoeber,
ibid. For additional material see: Michael Morgan, "USSR's Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the Future," Defense
and Foreign Affairs , Washington, D.C., Dec. 1979.
4 . Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State , London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George
S. Brown (USAF) C-JCS, Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States For Fiscal Year
1979 , p. 103; National Security Council, Review of Non-Fuel Mineral Policy , (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew
Middleton, The New York Times , (9/15/79); Time , 9/21/80.
5 . Elie Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
6 . Al-Thawra , Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram ,12/30/79, Al Ba'ath , Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs are 20 years old and
younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas,
Oded Yinon, "Egypt's Population Problem," The Jerusalem Quarterly , No. 15, Spring 1980.
7 . E. Kanovsky, "Arab Haves and Have Nots," The Jerusalem Quarterly , No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba'ath , Syria, 5/6/79.
8 . In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli government is in fact responsible for the
design of American policy in the Middle East, after June '67, because of its own indecisiveness as to the future of
the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established the background for Resolution 242 and
certainly twelve years later for the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin,
on June 19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he did not mention anything
about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly on the same day the government resolved to return territories
in exchange for peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered its position but
contrary to its decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S. of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in
the Security Council on the basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories. At that point
it was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel's policy. From here the way was opened to peace
agreements on the basis of 242 as was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut ,
( Ma'ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
9 . Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an interview ( Ma 'ariv ,10/3/80) that the
Israeli government failed to prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements and was itself surprised
by the cost of the agreements, although already during the negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price
and the serious error involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the withdrawal from the oil fields,
Israel would have a positive balance of payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the
government of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was referring to the Camp
David agreements ( Ha'aretz , 11/3/78). In the course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an
economics advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and expertise in
economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain
our respect and the respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha'aretz 1/5/79. Jerusalem Post , 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin,
formerly a senior consultant in the Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha'aretz , 5/5/79.
Ma'ariv , 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields and Israel's energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan
Eisenberg, a government advisor on these matters, Ma'arive Weekly , 12/12/78. The Energy Minister, who
personally signed the Camp David agreements and the evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the
seriousness of our condition from the point of view of oil supplies more than once...see Y ediot Ahronot , 7/20/79.
Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the
Camp David and Blair House negotiations. Ha'aretz , 8/22/79.
10 . Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on intentions to give the army
preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic needs for which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former
Prime Minister Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an interview 7/25/78,
and the paper Al Akhbar , 12/2/78 which clearly stressed that the military budget will receive first priority, despite
the peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his cabinet's programmatic document
which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78. See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10.
According to these sources, Egypt's military budget increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and 1978, and the
process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the Egyptians plan to increase their militmy budget by 100% in
the next two years; Ha'aretz , 2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post , 1/14/79.
11 . Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt's ability to reconstruct its economy by 1982. See
Economic Intelligence Unit , 1978 Supplement, "The Arab Republic of Egypt"; E. Kanovsky, "Recent Economic
Developments in the Middle East," Occasional Papers , The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, "The
Egyptian Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors," Occasional Papers , June 1978; Robert McNamara,
President of World Bank, as reported in Times , London, 1/24/78.
12 . See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and research camed
out in the Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the British scientist, Denis
Champlin, Military Review , Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in
Sinai ...by Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the Military Options after the Peace
Treaty with Egypt , by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y. Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports including El
Hawadeth , London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi , Paris, 12/14/79.
13 . As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and Moslems see the series of articles
published in the Kuwaiti paper, El Qabas , 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between
Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian , London, 6/24/80, and Desmond Stewart, Middle East
Internmational , London 6/6/80. For other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian , London, 12/24/79; The
Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour , London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14 . Arab Press Service , Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic , 8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha'aretz , 3/21/80,
and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist , 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times , London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times ,
3/30/80.
15 . J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde , Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas Kelidar, Middle East Review , Summer 1979;
Conflict Studies , ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit , ( Ha'aretz , 9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report ,
10/10/79, Afro-Asian Affairs , London, July 1979.
16 . Arnold Hottinger, "The Rich Arab States in Trouble," The New York Review of Books , 5/15/80; Arab Press
Service , Beirut, 6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report , 11/5/79 as well as El Ahram , 11/9/79; El Nahar El
Arabi Wal Duwali , Paris 9/7/79; El Hawadeth , 11/9/79; David Hakham, Monthly Review , IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17 . As for Jordan's policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali , 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri,
Ma'ariv 6/8/79; Prof. Tanter, Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post , 5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El
Qabas , 11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth Congress, Damascus, August 1980.
The Shefa'amr program of the Israeli Arabs was published in Ha'aretz , 9/24/80, and by Arab Press Report 6/18/80.
For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha'aretz , 2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel,
Ma'ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO's position towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review ; July 1980; Hani El
Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al'Am , Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov, "The Palestinian Problem," Survival , ISS,
London Jan. Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, "The Palestinian Myth," Commentary , Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, "The
Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary Jan. 75; Monday Morning , Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of Palestine
Studies , Winter 1980.
18 . Prof. Yuval Neeman, "Samaria--The Basis for Israel's Security," Ma'arakhot 272-273, May/June 1980; Ya'akov
Hasdai, "Peace, the Way and the Right to Know," Dvar Hashavua , 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth--An
Israeli Perspective," Ma'arakhot 270-271, October 1979; Yitzhak Rabin, "Israel's Defense Problems in the
Eighties," Ma'arakhot October 1979.
19 . Ezra Zohar, In the Regime's Pliers (Shikmona, 1974); Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth
Versus Legend (Reshafim, 1981).
20 . Henry Kissinger, "The Lessons of the Past," The Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, "OPEC's
Challenge to the West," The Washington Quarterly , Winter, 1980; Walter Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West,"
Foreign Affairs , Summer 1980; Special Report--"Our Armed Forees-Ready or Not? " U.S. News and World Report
10/10/77; Stanley Hoffman, "Reflections on the Present Danger," The New York Review of Books 3/6/80; Time
4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez "The illusions of SALT" Commentary Sept. 79; Norman Podhoretz, "The Present
Danger," Commentary March 1980; Robert Tucker, "Oil and American Power Six Years Later," Commentary Sept.
1979; Norman Podhoretz, "The Abandonment of Israel," Commentary July 1976; Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the
Middle East," Commentary July 1979.
21 . According to figures published by Ya'akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot , 10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic
incidents recorded in the world in 1979 was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain
the number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the U.S. as well there has been a sharp
increase in anti-Semitic incidents which were reported in that article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon,
"The New Anti-Semitism," The New Republic , 9/18/1976; Barbara Tuchman, "They poisoned the Wells,"
Newsweek 2/3/75.
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