The central strategy was to 'establish and protect a new order' that accounts 'sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership,' while at the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of 'deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.' Wolfowitz outlined plans for military intervention in Iraq as an action necessary to assure 'access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf oil' and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and threats from terrorism.
Wolfowitz, argued in the draft 'Defense Planning Guidance' (DPG) for realigning US forces globally. The same draft, which was largely repudiated by the first Bush administration after it was leaked to the New York Times (1992), also argued for 'a unilateral US defense guarantee' to Eastern Europe 'preferably in co-operation with other NATO states,' and the use of pre-emptive force against nations suspected of having weapons of mass destruction - both views which are now mostly codified in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the US.
The draft DPG also argued that US military intervention should become a 'constant fixture' of the new world order. It is precisely that capability which the Pentagon realignments have been directed.
With forward bases located all along the so-called 'arc of instability,' Washington could pre-position equipment and military personnel that would permit it to intervene with force within hours of the outbreak of any crisis.
In that respect, the new global strategy would be similar to the US position of the last century vis-à-vis Latin America, where the US has frequently intervened to protect its interests from real or perceived threats.
Nearby countries so involved included Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti and several others. The interventions were usually followed by long occupations and the establishment of friendly but authoritarian regimes, like those of Batista, Somoza and 'Papa Doc' Duvalier. The US Contra war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s might be considered a sequel to the earlier action. America's increasing role in Colombia's current civil war also fits the pattern.
On a grander scale, the US has assisted military takeovers in larger countries like Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, with the usual bloody results.
Max Boot, a neo-conservative writer at the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out that, Wolfowitz's 1992 draft was not all that different from the 1903 Theodore Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine asserted Washington's 'international police power' to intervene against 'chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society.'
The new and proposed deployments are being justified by similar rhetoric. Just substitute 'globalization' for 'civilization.'
The emerging Pentagon doctrine, founded mainly on the work of retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, chief of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation, and Thomas Barnett of the Naval War College, argues that it is precisely countries and regions that are 'disconnected' from the prevailing trends of economic globalization that posed the greatest dangers
On the eve of the war in Iraq, which has been followed by an occupation increasingly under siege, Barnett predicted that taking Baghdad would not be about settling old scores or enforcing the disarmament of those famous weapons of mass destruction, yet to be found. Rather, he wrote, it 'will mark a historic tipping point - the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization.'
Barnett's so-called arc corresponds well to regions of oil, gas and mineral wealth, a reminder again of Wolfowitz's 1992 draft study. It asserted that the key objective of US strategy should be 'to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.'
PNAC mission statement
June 3, 1997
American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.
We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.
As the 20th century draws to a close, the US stands as the world's pre-eminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the US have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the US have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?
We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greaterchallenges that lie ahead.
We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the US' global responsibilities.
Of course, the US must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities,we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.
Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:
• we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
• we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
• we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
• we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the US is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.
This mission statement was signed by the following: Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush , Dick Cheney, Eliot A., Cohen Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes,Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle,Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis, Libby Norman Podhoretz,Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen,Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel, Paul Wolfowitz.
A PNAC Timeline
The PNAC intention was (and is) to explain what world leadership entails through issue briefs, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars. (Also, as an aside, the 'PNAC gave birth to a new group, The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq,which met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in order to formulate a plan to 'educate' the American populace about the need for war in Iraq. Its mission statement was to replace the Saddam Hussein regime with a democratic government, engaging in educational and advocacy efforts to mobilize the US and international support for their policies. The CLI funneled millions of taxpayer dollars to support the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi heir presumptive,Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi was sentenced in absentia by a Jordanian court in 1992 to 22 years in prison for bank fraud after the collapse of Petra Bank, which he founded in 1977. Chalabi has not set foot in Iraq since 1956, but his Enron-like business credentials apparently make him a good match for the Bush administration's plans).
Whilst Wolfowitz and Cheney were developing their thesis various rightist intellectuals outside the government were spelling out the new PNAC policy in books and influential journals. Zalmay M. Khalilzad (formerly associated with big oil companies (unocol), currently US Special Envoy to Afghanistan & Iraq ) wrote an important volume in 1995, 'From Containment to Global Leadership:
America & the World After the Cold War,' the import of which was identifying a way for the US to move aggressively in the world and thus to exercise effective control over the planet's natural resources. A year later, in 1996, neo-conservative (as members of this group are often described) leaders Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, in their Foreign Affairs article 'Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,' came right out and said the goal for the US had to be nothing less than 'benevolent global hegemony,' a euphemism for total US domination, but 'benevolently' exercised, of course.
In 1998, PNAC unsuccessfully lobbied President Clinton to attack Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. The January letter from PNAC urged America to initiate that war even if the US could not muster full support from the Security Council at the United Nations.
The PNAC in September of 2000, issued its white paper on 'Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for the New Century.' The PNAC report was quite frank about why the US would want to move toward imperialist militarism, a Pax Americana, because with the Soviet Union out of the picture, now was the time most 'conducive to American interests and ideals. The challenge of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American peace'.'
The paper called for unprecedented levels of military spending, American military bases in Central Asia and Middle East, toppling of non-complying regimes (Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan) abrogation of international treaties, control of the world's energy sources, militarization of outer space, total control of cyberspace, and the willingness to use nuclear weapons to achieve 'American' goals.
The PNAC were also very aware of an emerging economically and militarily empowered
China which could in their thinking provide a credible threat to the American status as sole world power in the medium term.
This plan indicated that Bush's cabinet intended to take military control of Iraq (and a number of other countries that were deemed to be enemies of American interests) and reminded that the US for decades had sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. What was lacking was the moment of opportunity to enact that aspiration into reality.
In serving as world 'constable,' the PNAC report went on, no other countervailing forces will be permitted to get in the way. Such actions 'demand American political leadership rather than that of the United Nations,' for example. No country will be permitted to get close to parity with the US when it comes to weaponry or influence; therefore, more US military bases will be established in the various regions of the globe.
Currently, it is estimated that the US has nearly 150 military bases and deployments
in different countries around the world, with the most recent major increase being in the Caspian Sea/Afghanistan/Middle East areas.
Neo Conservative perspective
What is clear is that the neo conservative (neocon) vision has become the hard core of American foreign policy, making the neo-cons every critic's favorite demon. Wolfowitz and Perle are the leading lights, most agree, joined by a supporting cast including I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Cheney's chief of staff; Feith, the Pentagon's No. 3, and leading ideologues in the Beltway commentariat like William Kristol and Robert Kagan. Collectively, they are often portrayed as a cabal of conspiring former Democratic hawks who grew alienated from their party after Vietnam. Typically, the neocons are characterized as intellectual groupies who worship Leo Strauss, a mid-20th-century philosopher who idealized Platonic virtues in rulers and whose views have been summed up as 'it's the regime, stupid.'
In fact, some like Perle and Kagan say their views have nothing to do with Strauss, and Wolfowitz, for one, mocks the idea that he is a Straussian. Yes, he took two college courses from Strauss, but he asks, chuckling, 'You need an obscure political philosopher to understand that it makes a difference what kind of regime rules Iraq?' The neocons, many of whom are Jewish, are also sometimes caricatured as shills for Israel's hard-right Likud Party-even by some in the
senior GOP establishment. But that does little to explain how the neo-cons have won the hearts and minds of Methodists like Cheney, Presbyterians like national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice or WASPs like Rumsfeld.
The neo-con view is supposed as being far more complex than most of these portraits suggest. Essentially a rebirth of Reaganism (though some reaganites are loathed to accept this idea), today's neo-conservatism has deep roots in the old ideological fights of the cold-war era. It stands at heart for a robust marriage of power and principle, a fusing of America's precision-guided ability to change regimes with an evangelical belief that the only right regime is
democracy. Driving it all is the idea that thanks to America's unrivaled might, this is the moment in history to complete the global transformation begun by Ronald Reagan-who declared in 1982 that tyranny was destined for the ash heap of history-and left unfinished after the cold war. Especially in a post-9-11 world, this is no time for old-fashioned conservatism.However the hard-liners like Wolfowitz and moderates like Secretary of State Colin Powell are mainly refighting the battles of detente vs confrontation over the Soviet Union. It's the same debate-trying to make dictators more friendly or replacing them with 'democracy' under the control of an American administration and not with other dictators.
Wolfowitz, for one, resists neat labels to describe his views. He also denies that he has any grand global strategy. For hawks like him, the invasion of Iraq was in large part about finishing a war that never really ended in 1991. But it was also about dispensing with a traditional GOP foreign policy dependent on careful consensus and alliance-building in favor of a more aggressive one.
Leaving Saddam in power in 1991, merely handing Kuwait back to its rulers after the gulf war, had been a classic 'realist' response once favored by the GOP establishment. But after 9-11 conservatives considered the decision to restore the Arab status quo their biggest mistake, the chief sin of Bush the father. Over the next decade it seemingly generated militants like Osama bin Laden, left WMD in the hands of defiant rulers like Saddam and 'peace' in the hands
of allegedly 'corrupt autocrats' like Yasir Arafat. September 11 was in their eyes an indictment of every policymaker over the decade who'd seen the Arab world merely as solely a gas station to the globe. The Arabs in their eyes had to change, fundamentally.
Partly what fuels the neo-cons' air of certainty is their sense that they've been vindicated by history. Wolfowitz, like Perle, is only in his latest of many incarnations in power. Thirty-four years ago he and Perle had first worked together in pushing for missile defense, decrying the arms-control accords that needlessly held America's superior technology back, fulfilling the agenda of their mutual mentor, cold-war hawk and grand theorist Albert Wohlstetter. On
this, as on so many things, they believed they had been prescient: the Soviet Union, more economically backward than anyone knew, collapsed in the face of US Defense spending, unable to keep up with the high-tech wizardry that today gives America its unparalleled might. It was Wolfowitz who, as far back as the Carter administration, also first warned of the danger from Saddam. And it was Wolfowitz who, in 1992, authored a Defense planning paper that stirred a huge controversy in Washington by declaring that America intended to remain the world's
only great power.
These aggressive world perceptions has found George W. Bush, a novice in foreign affaires, susceptible to its persuasive arguments and rationale. Bush is himself far more of a Reaganite than he is an acolyte of his father. The neo-Reaganite vision has provided a liturgy and a purpose to the president's Christian evangelical sense of destiny, and imbued his Texas tough-guy persona with an historic crusade. Rather revealingly even before September 11th 2001, the neo-cons felt they had a soulmate, says Richard Perle, that the son had 'a more robust world view' than the father. 'He was prepared to assume greater risk for greater gains,' says Perle. He was in effect open to persuasion and direction.
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